Strikes and the law; the problems of legal intervention in labour disputes by Anderson, Gordon
New Zealand journal of industrial relations, 1988, 13, 21-32 
Strikes and the law; the problems of legal 
intervention in labour disputes 
Gordon Anderson* 
This paper sets out some of the background to the provisions in the Labour Relations Act 
1987 that regulate the right of trade unions to strike and that set out the legal 
consequences that apply if a strike is contrary to the provisions of the Act. These issues 
are discussed with an emphasis on some of the difficulties that existed before 1987. The 
paper will conclude with a discussion of the policy options available to the Goverment at 
that time and of the various submissions and proposals made by the major parties. The 
provisions in the Labour Relations Act and their application in practice are dealt with in a 
second paper in this symposium (Hughes and Anderson, 1988). 
Introduction 
Legal intervention in industrial relations has always been a topic that creates considerable 
controversy both as to the extent that such intervention should occur and as to its 
desirability. In understanding the problems that exist and the solutions to them that were 
attempted in the Labour Relations Act it is important to have some understanding of the 
background to the development of the Jaw. In particular, the fact that the law has generally 
been hostile to trade unionism and to collective action must be recognised and taken into 
account. It is well known that one of the most significant barriers to the growth of 
effective trade unionism throughout the nineteenth century was judicial hostility to the 
trade union movement and to collective action by workers. This early history has 
conditioned much of the present hostility and suspicion directed towards the law and to the 
courts from amongst trade unionists. Moreover twentieth century developments have not 
helped to remove these suspicions. In New Zealand one only has to consider the advent of 
the labour injunction or of the extremely restrictive view of the ultra vires doctrine that 
the courts applied to the objects of trade unions. In the United Kingdom, still a major 
source of New Zealand law, the courts have steadily increased the scope of the economic 
torts and have taken a restrictive view of legislation designed to protect union rights 
(Wedderburn, 1986, ch. 7-8). 
The present law is to a large extent a renection of the neccesity to overcome the hostility 
of the law and of the judiciary so as to create a legal environment in which trade unions 
are able to operate with some degree of effectiveness. It is these efforts, for example, that 
have given rise to the debate over so-called trade union "immunities" and to the subsequent 
argument that trade unions are in some way above the Jaw . Because of these efforts 
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collective labour law has developed largely as a collection of exceptions to the common 
law. 
A second point that warrants some consideration is the question of the ideol_ogical 
premises that underly the present law and the auitudes of the JUdtctary towards unionism 
and to collective action. Modem labour law is a mixture of statute and common law and 
naturally reflects the premises that exist in these areas of law. This is particulary apparent 
in the case of the common law which is dominated by the notiOns of freedom of contract 
and assumed equality of bargaining power as well as a particular perspective of property 
rights. Many modem labour law academics have argued for the autonomy of labour law, 
that is the concept that labour Ia w should be treated as a separate branch of the_ law 
embodying its own values that are appropriate to industrial relations, an approach whtch It 
is hoped will help overcome some of the problems in the present legal structure. This 
approach involves a radical re-thinking of the values appropnate to labour law and a maJor 
departure from those values that presently prevail such as the subordinaLe position of ~e 
worker and the assumed property rights of the employer (see the arguments surnmansed m 
Wedderburn, 1987 pp.l-4). 
The possibilities for legal intervention 
The law can intervene in an industrial dispute in a number of ways although these may 
not neccesarily be consistent and may overlap or, indeed, be in conflict with each other. 
The main possibilities for intervention, put perhaps simplistically, are: 
(I) The criminal law: This was the basis of the fust of the nineteenth century legal attacks 
on unions when unions were regarded as illegal and as criminal conspiracies. Wedderburn 
(1986, p. 578) refers to one case, R v Selsby where strikers were faced with an 
indictment of 4914 counts and 57 yards long. Direct intervention by the criminal law is 
now of no significance in New Zealand, although it should be remembered that strikers 
were liable to criminal penalties until 1978 under the Industrial Relations Act and even 
laLer under under Part IVA of the Commerce Act 1975. The criminal law today is however 
still relevant to the conduct of a strike and in particular to the conduct of picketing. It is 
deceptively easy to be guilty of such offences as trespass, obstruction , offensive language 
or assault 
(2) Civilliabiltty in common law for the consequences of industrial action: The most well 
known form of this intervention is of course through the various economic torts, although 
there are other possibilities available including breach of contract and the recent innovation 
of economic duress. 
(3) Statutory intervention: Unlike the first two cases, which are primarily cases of judicial 
intervention, statutory intervention is predominately political in nature and normally 
mtended to have a general reforming effect on the law. Statutory intervention can take 
many forms, from ad hoc legislation to deal with a particular issue, I to a comprehensive 
code of labour law. Statutory intervention does not of course preclude judicial 
~ntervention . Indeed the judiciary are often central to the implementation of legislation, an 
mfluence that can be crucial to its success as the judicial interpretation of legislation can 
have a significant effect on the operation of the law in practice and in some cases can alter 
the legislative intentions. 
eg . The Whangarci Refmery Expansion Project Disputes Act 1984. 
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(4) Finally there is what could be termed "total intervention", which is a combination of 
all the above forms of intervention in combination with the deployment of the state's 
coercive resources, normally in the form of the police and the military. This type of 
intervention is unusual, at least in recent times, and is normally reserved for what a 
government regards as a major threat to law and order or to its economic or social policies. 
The two main examples in New Zealand are the 1912-13 Waihi and General strikes and the 
1951 waterfront dispute. A more recent example is the British miners' strike in 1984-85. 
In practice of course industrial relations and industrial disputes are subjected to a 
combination of all the above forms of intervention. 
Legal intervention in New Zealand 
Before looking at some particular problems that result from the intervention of the law 
into industrial disputes it is worth recalling something of the history and of the changes in 
philosophy that have occurred in New Zealand's industrial law since 1894, and more 
particularly since the 1970s. 
One of the major aims of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894 was to 
end the need for strikes and to substitute a system of judicial arbitration through the Court 
of Arbitration (Holt, 1986, ch. 1). In order to facilitate this, strikes were proscribed in 
most circumstances and criminal sanctions made available against striking workers. In 
practice however, strikes gradually became acceptable, or probably more accurately, 
tolerated within limits. Attempts to prosecute strikers were also soon found to resolve 
neither the strike nor indeed to be a particularly satisfactory form of legal proceeding. A 
real gap between the legislative structure and industrial relations practice became more 
apparent in the post-war years and particularly in the 1960s and 1970s as New Zealand 
moved towards what was, in effect, a collective bargaining system where strikes were 
becoming an increasingly common aspect of bargaining behavior. These changes were 
acknowledged in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1970 when 
new dispute procedures were introduced and a clear distinction between interest and rights 
disputes began to emerge. 
The Industrial Relations Act 1973 completed this process and for the first time some 
attempt was made to define the circumstances in which strikes should not attract legal 
sanctions . The Act removed statutory penalties for strikes during a dispute of interest 
subject to the dispute not being before a conciliation council. At the same time a variety 
of new disputes procedures were reformed or introduced to deal with disputes of rights 
including personal grievances.2 The basic scheme that was eventually to reach fruition in 
the 1987 Act had thus begun to emerge, that is that strikes were permissible in resolving 
disputes of interest but that disputes of right should be settled by set procedures and if 
neccesary by resort to the Arbitration Court. 
A second issue raised in 1973, that of the appropriate sanctions for striking in breach of 
the Act and in particular whether such actions should be regarded as criminal, was not 
2 Many of these procedures were first introduced in the 1970 Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Amendment Act. 
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however resolved until 1978 when the recommendations in the Dunlop Report (1978)3 
were enacted by the then National Government. This Report concluded that cnmmal 
penalties for striking were inappropriate and should be replaced wtth ctvtl penalues. The 
major reasons for this conclusion seem to have been that cnmmal sancuons Introduced 
inflexibility into the admimstration of the legtslatwn and ltmtted the extent to whtch 
industrial relations factors could be taken into account by the DepartmentofLabour when 
considering a decision to prosecute. Prosecutions were also se~n as causmg constd~rable 
practical difficulties especially when large numbers of prosecuuons were bemg constdered 
as had been the case during the events leading up to the report. These problems. could tt 
was felt, be overcome by introducing civil sanctions. Since 1978 such penalues have been 
used by employers rather than the govemment.4 
In 1973 a new code to govern New Zealand's industrial relations system was implemented, 
a code that was designed to cope with some of the major changes that had occurred in the 
industrial relations system over the last two decades. At the same time however, these 
developments were put at risk and the logic of the Act's structure was threatened by the 
intrusion of the common law into the industrial relations arena. 
The intrusion of the common law 
Two decisions of the Supreme Court in 1970; Pete's Towing Services v Northern IUW 
and F/e/1 v Northern Transport Drivers IUW introduced a new dimension to the 
application of the common law to the conduct of industrial disputesin New Zealand. The 
Court of Appeal's 1973 decision in Northern Drivers IUW v Kawau Island Ferries Ltd 
afftm1ed and consolidated this development. This intrusion and the reasons why it should 
have been resisted have been discussed elsewhere (Anderson, 1987) but the main points 
should be reiterated. 
The most important is that this development was in effect, if not in terms of conventional 
legal theory, an intrusion of foreign law into the existing statutory system of New 
Zealand labour law. United Kingdom law, or to be precise the common law component of 
English law, was taken from its own peculiar environment and transplanted in New 
Zealand. The part not transplanted moreover was that part of the law that had been 
carefully structured in the United Kingdom to limit the excesses that the development of 
the common law had led to. This transplant took place without debate or consultation and 
was carried out by a few judges whose understanding of industrial relations realities was 
probably limited. 
To fully appreciate the significance of this argument, it must be remembered that since 
1906 trade unions in the United Kingdom have had the benefit of statutory immunity from 
most actions in tort that arise in the course of an industrial dispute. The judiciary have 
thus been free to develop the common law in a way that would almost certainly have been 
inc?nceivable in the absence of those immunities. The economic torts as developed in the 
Umted Kmgdom barely acknowledge that unions and collective action have any legitimate 
funcuon whatsoever. Clark and Wedderburn (1983, p. 141) put the matter thus: "in the 
face of common law liabilities trade unions have no rights to function or even to exist." 
In the absence of these immunities the common law would probably have remained 
4 
The original Act passed by a Labour Government removed penalties but they were 
reinsened by a later National Government. 
See for example Osbourne v Robertson . 
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extremely restrictive but it is extremely unlikely that the judiciary could have travelled 
through the greatest part of this century without developing the common law to take some 
account of trade union activities. Instead the immunities allowed the issue of union 
legitimacy to be avoided and if anything probably worsened the position at common law. 
The judiciary has seldom concealed its distaste of the immunities (Clark and Wedderburn, 
1983, pp. 166-173). It was this extremely skewed version of the common law that was 
transplanted into New Zealand. The significance of the intrusion by the common law and 
its potential impact can be judged by looking at the range of consequences that resulted: 
(1) The legislative policy of the previous 80 years, that industrial disputes should be 
litigated in a specialist court, was negated. Moreover the state of the common law was 
such that employers gained significant tactical and legal advantages by resorting to the 
courts of general jurisdiction rather than the Arbitration Court. 
(2) The possibility of a conflict between the statute and the common law arose. For 
example, a strike permitted by statute could well be unlawful at common law. In addition, 
the system of statutory dispute settlement procedures was undermined by allowing access 
to an alternative system where the industrial issues were largely irrelevant. 
(3) The potential for a major legal attack on the trade union movement as a whole arose. 
The common law permitted potential actions to recover damages to such an extent that the 
trade union movement's viability could have been threatened, either directly through the 
financial costs such actions would have imposed or because of the chilling effect they 
could have had on the willingness of a union to become involved in strikes. In practice 
this did not occur, although there has been an increasing use of the common law to 
prevent or to stop strikes by the use of injunctions and in the last few years some 
indications that damages may be sought against unions on a substantial scale (Hughes, 
1987). 
(4) The labour injunction became available as a weapon in industrial disputes . The 
injunction was a weapon that particularly favoured employers and as such resulted in a 
major change in the balance of power in industrial disputes. 
The labour injunction 
Probably the most controversial judicial intervention into labour disputes has been 
through the use of the injunction, and in particular the interlocutory injunction, as a 
means of restraining or preventing strikes or other forms of industrial action by workers 
and their unions. The labour injunction has, probably accurately, been described by one 
American unionist as "the most perfect . . strike-breaking agency there is on earth" 
(Mills and Montgomery, 1945 p. 631), a description that accounts for the hostility of 
trade unions towards its use. It has also been said that it is " society's way of em ulating 
the ostrich by sticking its head in tl1e sand" (Cox, 1967 p. 693). This latter description, 
while directed to the fact that such injunctions do not solve the underlying problems that 
result in strikes, could equally accurately describe the response of the legal system, and 
that of much of the judiciary, to the realities of industrial life and to collective action by 
workers. 
Although the injunction as a strike breaking weapon gained its greatest notoriety in the 
United States after Re Deb's in 1895, injunctions had been issued in cases involving 
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labour disputes as early as 1868 in Britain.5 Deb' s case was the forerunner of an 
increasing number of cases that continued until the. Norns-La Guardia Act of 1932 
restricted their application in that country. In the Umted Kmgdom, labour InJunctiOns 
have been commonly used since the war and mcreasmgly smce the Conservallve 
Government's restrictions on union immunities and on the nght to strike that were enact~ 
after the 1979 election. In New Zealand the injunction seems to have flfst .appear~ m 
1970 and since that time it has been reasonably popular with employers and mcreasmgly 
so in recent years. 
The arguments against labour injunctions are well known •. and have been refered to in a 
previous paper (Boast, 1988), and the detai ls of thelf applicatiOn m New Zealand labour 
law have been well described by Hughes (1986). It is nevertheless worth reviewmg some 
points in a little detail. The list of arguments below are partially derived from an article 
published in 1937 and written by a lawyer who went on to become Chief Jusl!ce of 
Canada (Laskin, 1937), showing perhaps how little attitudes and the law have changed m 
the intervening fi.fty years. The major arguments against labour injunctions are: 
(1) In the majority of cases they act as a fi.nal determination of the issues involved. Once 
the immediate aim of breaking the strike has been achieved and a return to work forced, the 
employer will not not normally be interested in pursuing the matter to a full hearing. 
Even if this was done and the union's case upheld, the issue in dispute would be long dead 
and have been decided in circumstances where the union's bargaining position was 
considerably weakened. It is this reason in particular that leads on to many of the points 
made below. An interim injunction may well be appropriate where the preservation of the 
status quo involves a static position being preserved but this is far less obvious in a 
dynamic situation that typifi.es an industrial dispute. 
(2) The procedure gives a considerable tactical advantage to the employer. The employer as 
plaintiff can choose when to initiate an action and will inevitably do so at a time to gain 
the maximum advantage. A cynic could well think that many ex parte applications are 
sought not for reasons of genuine urgency but for the tactical advantage given. When 
advance notice of the strike is given, or the strike is otherwise predictable, the employer's 
solicitors can prepare the case with care and with a degree of leisure, and at the same time, 
by late fi.ling put considerable pressure on the solicitors for the union. Thus even before 
the union and its solicitors reach the court doors they may already be at a considerable 
disadvantage. 
(3) Interlocutory injunctions are granted on affidavi t evidence. The problems with such 
evidence is that it is not subject to cross-examination, and as Laskin puts it, "the judge . 
. . is asked to choose between conflicting documentary statements in which both sides 
strain the truth to say the least" (1937, p. 271). This latter problem is of course avoided 
altogether where an ex parte injunction is sought. In an interlocutory hearing the 
employer may also have a considerable advantage in the presentation of evidence as it is 
the employer who initiates the proceedings and is thus in a position to ensure that their 
evidence is better prepared. Careful timing is also more likely to see the union unprepared 
to counter such evidence. Faced with carefully prepared evidence, especially if one side is 
not represented a judge may have little choice but to take that evidence at face value. As it 
is unlikely that an action will ever reach a full trial the result is that the case is determined 
on, at best, unsatisfactory evidence. 
Spring head Spinning Co v Riley and see generally Thomson ( 1966). 
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(4) The tests used by the courts favour the employer. The American Cyanimid "serious 
issue to be tried" test means that the threshold the employers case must meet falls well 
below that which will be needed at the full hearing. If the union does raise possible 
defences or questions of factual dispute they are likely to be seen as being issues best left 
for a full hearing. 
The second test, that of "the balance of convenience" will also generally favour the 
employer. It is not difficult, especially given time to prepare, to present evidence to show 
considerable losses involved should the strike be allowed to continue. Union arguments 
directed to more intangible losses such as loss of bargaining position, even if accepted, are 
unlikely to be convincing. The courts prefer to think in financial terms. Employers suffer 
financial losses compared to the intangible and non-quantifiable loss that a union could 
claim. Moreover any financial loss the union or its members suffer is likely to be small 
and easily meet by an employer. The opposite applies to the union. The limited financial 
resources of the union to meet a possible award of damages are seen as an additional 
argument favouring the grant of an injunction. 
(5) Finally there is the argument that the labour injunction is perceived by workers and 
unions as putting the courts, as Laskin puts it, " in the ranks of the employer" . This 
perception can only undermine the respect for the court involved and lessen confidence in 
the law generally. 
In a discussion of labour injunctions it is important to appreciate that two issues are 
involved. The fust is the underlying law which provides the base on which the application 
for an injunction is founded. Equally important however is the procedural and evidential 
basis on which the application is decided. 
The wuierlying law 
The present paper is not the place for a detailed discussion of the law that is applicable to 
industrial conflict. The law is both complex and uncertain in its detail. Nevertheless some 
understanding of the essential nature of this law is necessary to appreciate both the 
problems that arise with applications for labour injunctions and with common law actions 
in general in industrial relations cases. In order to bring an application for an injunction, 
or any other remedy, a plaintiff must show that a legal right that has, in some way, been 
violated. In an industrial dispute this is normally achieved by showing that a union or its 
officials or its members are committing one or more of the economic torts in carrying out 
their industrial action. These torts are such that it is almost inevitable that a strike will 
result in at at least one of them being committed. Much of this branch of the law has in 
fact been been developed in cases concerning strikes and by a judiciary whose sympathies 
were seldom with the strikers. The tort of inducement to breach of contract is perhaps a 
good example. Any strike is almost certain to involve union officials and the union 
inducing workers to breach their contracts of employment and thus rendering the union and 
its officials liable in tort. While there is a defence of justification available the courts have 
never recognised trade union objectives as coming within this defence. This tort has, since 
the 1950s, steadily been broadened almost always to the detriment of unions (Wedderburn, 
1986 ch. 8). 
In the context of an interlocutory injunction the details of the actual law may however be 
of little importance because what matters is whether there is a serious issue to be tried. A 
good lawyer, given the state of the law, should have little trouble establishing that there is 
a convincing argument that in fact this is the case. The argument as to whether in fact 
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there has been a tort committed and whether there is a good defence is left to the full 
hearing should it ever take place. 
Procedure in injunction applications 
In an injunction application the procedural aspects as they relate to the form of evidence 
and the tests to be applied by the courts in deciding the apphcauon are of perhaps greater 
importance than the legal basis of the application. These tests have beeen discussed by 
Boast (1988, p. 33-34). At this point little needs to be added except the pomt that both the 
procedures and the tests used are far from satisfactory in cases mvolvmg mdustrial confltct. 
Trade union "immunities" 
If it is accepted that the common law makes the operation of trade unions and the viability 
of collective action untenable then the question of what protection should be given to trade 
union action must be addressed. One would hope that in New Zealand it is now generally, 
if not universally, accepted that workers have the right to organise through trade unions 
and to take collective action in respect of their conditions of employment. The limits to 
this right are obviously, subject to some debate. In common law countries this debate has 
been clouded by the form in which these rights have been granted. Unlike the situation in 
many countries where unions have been granted positive rights in relation to their 
collective bargaining activities, common law countries have granted "immunities" from 
some of the legal liabilities that would otherwise apply to trade unions. It is this 
technique that is largely responsible for claims that unions are in some way above the 
law. In spite of occasional views to the contrary, usually from the economic right, 
(e.g.Tur, 1982) these arguments have been shown on many occasions to be false (e.g. 
Clark & Wedderburn, 1983, Kahn-Freund, 1977) and it has been accepted by the 
Conservative Government in the United Kingdom that some degree of legal protection is 
neccessary if unions are to operate effectively (Department of Employment, I981). 
The question of trade union immunities from common law liability does not, prior to 
1985, seem to have been seriously discussed in New Zealand. 
The Green Paper debate and policy options 
When the Government announced its intention to undertake a review of New Zealand's 
industrial law the possibility for a major review of the basis of the right to strike and of 
thestructure and suitability of the statutory-common law mix seemed likely. Such a 
review to be effecuve needed a fundamental reappraisal of both law and practice and a 
consequent reconstruction of a New Zealand law of industrial conflict. Unfortunately, and 
for whatever reasons, this was not done by either the Government or by the major parties 
to the debate. Instead a pre-occupation with existing law, and in particular the common 
l~w, led to an unwillingness to undertake the fundamental remodelling that was required to 
give a coherent legal structure. 
The problems 
The discussion above has highlighted the main problems that existed in 1986. In 
summary they were: 
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(I) New Zealand's law governing industrial conflict had become an unfortunate mixture of 
common law and statute with the two often conflicting and with the legislative policy 
being at variance with the common law in some situations. The fact that much of this law 
was created in a foreign country and was transplanted to New Zealand with liule or no 
consideration as to its suitability hardly improved mallers. 
(2) The fundamental issue of whether and to what extent trade unions should have a right 
to strike had never been adequately addressed in legal terms. Moreover social, political and 
industrial relations beliefs and practice did not accord with those of the law. 
(3) The combination of common law and statute had resulted in New Zealand having one 
of the most restrictive systems of strike law amongst democratic countries. 
The responses 
In the Green Paper (1985, p. 276) the Government stated that it was seeking to provide 
legislation that "is relevant and respected." The accompanying discussion however, while 
describing the law existing at the time in some detail, did not directly confront the issues 
that needed to be dealt with. Thus the word "immunities" is not used in the very brief and 
vague discussion on whether the common law should be "restricted" .The more 
fundamental question of whether United Kingdom law is appropriate in New Zealand was 
not even raised. Indeed the myth of a universal common law is probably such that the 
question may not even have occurred to the authors of the Green Paper. 
The major submissions also failed to come to grips with the problem of creating a 
specifically New Zealand law of industrial conflict. The Employers' Federation submission 
(1986) merely stated that "common law action should contiue to be available" and that 
"there is no reason why either unions or employers should not remain accountable for 
unlawful actions under common law procedures." While this, for the Employers ' 
Federation, is an understandable position, it could perhaps have been expected that some of 
the substantial issues that this brief part of the submission glossed over might have been 
addressed. The Federation of Labour's submission (1986) is a little more detailed on this 
point and the need for some review of the law was recognised. Indeed the need to recognise 
union rights in a positive way was expressly mentioned. Unfortunately the Federation 
seemed to fall back on the United Kingdom "immunity" solution rather than going foward 
to suggest some new proposal designed for New Zealand conditions. The summary of 
submissions (Department of Labour, 1986) also seemed to show that the overall pattern of 
submissions was varied and generally in conflict. This is of course not surprising given 
the range of views on strikes and the emotions that both strikes and unions generate. This 
range of submissions does not however aid sensible decision making and the resulting Act 
is something of a compromise rather than a rational solution. 
The solutions 
The details of the 1987 reforms are discussed in detail in a later paper in this symposium 
(Hughes and Anderson, 1988). At this stage they are merely outlined. 
(I) The common law was left untouched in relation to both injunctions and actions for 
damages. The problem of conflicting policies was overcome by the grant of a limited 
immunity to trade unions in respect of strikes specifically defined as "lawful". 
(2) A very limited "right" to strike was created. 
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(3) The transfer of the majority of potential litigation resulting fro~ strikes _to the Labour 
Court was adopted as a means of overcoming the problems of havmg two different courts 
involved in such litigation. 
Conclusion 
At the time the Labour Relations Act 1987 was passed the New Zealand law governing 
industrial conflict was suffering from serious conceptual problems that were fundamental 
to the whole structure of the law. Rather than address these problems the choice was made 
to opt for pragmatic compromise and to try and patch up an inadequate system. None of 
the problems inherent in the common law have been addressed and equally the state of the 
law on labour injunctions remains virtually unchanged. Indeed decades of considered 
criticism of this device seem to have had little impact on either the courts or the 
legislature. Whether the changes made will be effective remains to be seen. What is tragic 
is that the probably the one major chance for the immediate future to consider the issues 
raised and to create a genuine New Zealand system of industrial law has been lost. 
In the opinion of the writer, these problems could best have been solved by the creation of 
a genuine code governing collective labour law in New Zealand. Industrial law is a field 
that is, more than any other, linked to the local political, social and economic 
environment. For that reason, the law should be the product of that environment. New 
Zealand has adopted this solution in many other areas where the common law has proved 
defective or out of touch with local conditions. One of the earliest examples was the 
criminal law and more recently significant areas of contract law have been codified. One 
would have thought that industrial law could have been similiarly treated. This process 
need not prejudge the terms of the debate, for a code can be just as restrictive as the 
common law. What codification might have achieved is a more rational and New Zealand-
based law. 
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